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A Introduction 
 
Cornell University, like many other academic institutions in the United States, 
was severely affected by the economic downturn and the financial meltdown that began 
in 2008. In May 2008, the university had projected a balanced operating budget over the 
next few years. By the fall of 2008 the university realized that these projections were way 
off. A combination of declining endowments, declining gifts for current operations, 
declining support from New York State (four of its colleges received some support from 
the state), increased needs for borrowing to finance ongoing capital projects (because of 
the failure of projected gift flows for capital construction to materialize) and increasing 
financial need of its undergraduate students because of declining family incomes, left the 
university with substantial operating budget deficits. The administration quickly 
understood that corrective actions had to be taken and that the university needed to 
rethink its cost structure. While layoffs would likely be necessary, because of its role as a 
major employer in the community in which it was located and its commitment to its 
employees, Cornell hoped to minimize the number of layoffs that occurred and the 
administration had the idea of funding a one-time early retirement incentive program for 
staff to encourage a voluntary reduction in its level of employment. 
Our paper uses administrative data from Cornell to try to develop an 
understanding of the factors that led Cornell employees to elect to participate in the 
program. Our focus is on answering two questions: First, in a decentralized large 
university setting where budget units face different financial situations, did differences in 
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variables related to the financial situations of the units, namely reductions in operating 
budgets and recent layoff experiences, influence the probability that eligible non-union1 
employees chose to participate in the program? Second, did the program lead to adverse 
selection, in the sense that people who chose to accept the early retirement offer were 
those who tended to be of “above average productivity”?  If the most productive staff 
were the ones who tended to accept the early retirement offer, the cost to the university in 
terms of lost productivity of the departing employees may offset the benefits of the 
program. 
To preview our major findings, we find that employees’ probabilities of accepting 
the early retirement offer were related to the budgetary pressures which they believed that 
their units faced. Moreover, while we cannot directly observe employee productivity, we 
can observe if employees were paid below or above average, given their personal 
characteristics, years of experience at Cornell, and job titles.  We find a low value for this 
relative pay variable is a characteristic of the average employee Cornell chose to layoff in 
recent years.  Furthermore, we find that employees who accepted the early retirement 
offer, on average, were paid less than we might expect given the above named variables. 
To the extent that the university’s annual merit increase system was working the way it 
should and relative salaries at the university reflect relative productivities, this suggests 
that adverse selection did not prove to be a problem.  That is, there is no evidence that the 
“above average ability” employees were most likely to take the early retirement package. 
                                                 
1 Non-union refers to Cornell employees whose positions are not covered under a collective 
bargaining agreement.  We restrict our analyses to the non-union population (except for a few 
falsification tests as we describe below) which represents 84% of those eligible for the retirement 
incentive.  This restriction is imposed because pay increases under Cornell’s collective bargaining 
contracts do not have merit pay components so relative pay comparisons among union workers 
will not yield meaningful comparisons of productivity differences.  
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B Data and methods 
B.1 Program details 
 
To evaluate the impact of job-related risk factors that may influence non-tenure-
track staff’s decisions to accept an early retirement program window offer, we use 
administrative data on all eligible non-union employees (n=1083) for the Staff 
Retirement Incentive (SRI) program at Cornell University.  The SRI was announced to 
the University community on February 27, 2009 and was made available to all non-
tenure-track staff aged 55 or older, with at least 10 years of eligible service at the 
university as of June 30, 2009, who received less than 25% of their salaries from 
sponsored research funds.2  The SRI only required employees leave a benefits eligible 
position at the university; employees “retiring” under the program were eligible to return 
to temporary non-benefits eligible positions and, after three years, to regular university 
employment. 
 The plan’s incentives included a taxable lump sum payment equal to one year of 
base pay and a nontaxable contribution to a defined contribution retirement fund of 30% 
of base pay. Enrollment in the SRI was only available for a fixed amount of time; 
employees were required to announce their intent to enroll in the program between March 
1st and March 30th of 2009.  Within this interval of time, there were no additional 
constraints that would make early or later enrollment desirable.3  After enrolling, 
                                                 
2 Specific exclusions were made for senior administrators reporting to the president of the 
university; County-Based Cornell Cooperative Extension Association employees who were paid 
by the local County Cooperative Extension Associations and not by Cornell; employees at 
Cornell’s Puerto Rico observatory; employees on long-term disability; employees on university 
leave (who are not guaranteed reemployment rights; and individuals who had submitted voluntary 
resignation letters prior to March 1st. 
3 The university had announced that if the number of submitted applicants exceeded the funds 
available to finance the program that it would base enrollment in the program on applicants’ 
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severance with the university from a benefits eligible position was required by June 30, 
2009.  Staff enrolled in the program received the same benefits provided to all staff 
retirees, including retiree health insurance coverage. 
The SRI was not the only retirement option offered to staff at the time.  A Phased 
Retirement Incentive (PRI), which previously had existed only for tenure-track faculty, 
was concurrently offered that permitted employees to reduce their working hours to 20 
per week for up to three years following enrollment. Under this program, salaries would 
be proportionately reduced, but benefits (such as retirement system contributions) would 
continue to be based on the employees’ full-time salary.  Employees could not enroll in 
both programs and the PRI required supervisor approval, while the SRI did not.  These 
differences could have caused some individuals that would otherwise have accepted the 
SRI in isolation to accept the PRI when offered together so our results should be seen as 
conditional on PRI availability. In practice, only two individuals enrolled in the PRI as of 
June 30, 2009. 
B.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Our analyses make use of data from three sources.  Our primary data source 
consists of administrative records on the universe of non-union individuals eligible for 
the SRI.  These data are typical of what would be available to administrators trying to 
understand take-up rates for similar incentive programs.  Other than salary data, for 
which we have ten years for each employee, and the SRI enrollment outcome; all other 
variables are as of the date the plan became available, March 1st, 2009.  In this primary 
                                                                                                                                                 
seniority at the university, not the date of their applications. Ultimately it decided to accept all of 
the eligible applications.   Any submitted application could be withdrawn before the window 
offer expired.  Any individual that received layoff notice while the window was available could 
still enroll in the program.  
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data source we have information on such items as retirement plan in which the individual 
is enrolled (defined benefit or defined contribution), demographic variables (such as age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, marital status and number of dependents currently covered by 
Cornell’s health insurance programs), employment unit (consisting of the 10 colleges and 
three administrative units), position typical weekly hours of work, job families, pay bands, 
years employed at Cornell, and years since the last job change within the university.  Job 
families are groupings of job positions by task area (such as Human Resources) or type of 
position (such as technical or administrative).  This variable is tied to job codes and job 
titles, and has relevance for compensation.  Pay bands are defined pay ranges (minimum 
and maximum) for positions meant to encourage equitable pay across employees with 
similar expertise or duties.  They are set at the university level and restrict management’s 
discretion in setting pay.  Higher pay bands typically reflect higher minimum, maximum, 
and medians for a pay range.  Pay bands in our sample fall into two main classifications: 
“banded” which consist of eighteen bands set by the university for staff positions, and 
“unclassified/academic/executive/” ones in which more flexibility is given management 
in setting pay than it had in the “banded” structure. 
Our second source of information is on historical employee counts and layoffs.  
Employee counts are by year as of the end of the fiscal year, June 30th, and are at the 
employment unit (college or administrative unit) level.  When per employee variables are 
computed, the denominator is the prior end-of-fiscal year employee count.  Our layoff 
data are at the individual level; for much or our analyses they are aggregated up to 
employment unit fiscal year numbers.  When we construct Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 layoff 
variables we only use layoff numbers through March 2009 and then multiply them by 
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1.333 to get a projected annual FY number.  We do this because layoffs in April, May, 
and June of 2009 were not observed by SRI applicants before they had to make their 
decisions by March 31, 2009 to enroll in the program and so we implicitly assume the 
employee projects that the rate of layoff for the last three months of the fiscal year would 
be the same as in the previous nine months.    
Our third set of data comes from budget reports available to the public on 
Cornell’s website.  FY budget reports, which include projections of the next FY’s 
resources and spending, are typically released in May of each year. So, for example, in 
May 2009, the FY 2010 (July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010) report was released. This report 
contained projected unit resources and expenditures for FY 2010. However, it was not 
released in time for employees considering whether to accept the SRI offer to use this 
information. While we could have assumed that employees had rational expectations, we 
instead assumed that they based their projections on likely unit budget changes in FY 
2010 on the budget changes that their units had experiences during FYs 2006 through 
2009.4  
In what follows we exclude three individuals who held multiple jobs, three 
individuals for whom retirement plan data were missing or who were enrolled in a hybrid 
defined benefit/contribution retirement plan, and four individuals for whom 2006 salary 
data were missing, for a total of ten individuals.5   Our analysis thus uses a sample of 
                                                 
4 In results not shown in this paper we estimated models using FY 2010 budget information to test 
an assumption of rational expectations.  The FY 2010 budget information was not available to the 
employees prior to accepting the SRI.  These models were inconsistent across specification and 
seldom had precise coefficients.  
5 One possibility for missing salary is that the individual was temporarily away from the 
university that year (for example a spouse of a faculty member accompanying the faculty member 
when he or she was on sabbatical). Eligibility for the SRI required 10 years of service, not 10 
consecutive years of service. 
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1073 individuals.  Approximately one-third of the non-union SRI eligible individuals 
chose to accept the retirement incentive. 
Unfortunately, several potentially important variables are absent from our data. 
We do not observe dependents, spouses, or partners in our administrative databases, but 
rather whether dependents, spouses or partners are covered by the employee’s health plan.  
We also do not observe spousal/partner or employee retirement wealth or health status.6  
The first column of panel A of Table 1 presents mean values for many of the 
variables used in this analysis.  A relatively small percentage, about 16% of the eligible 
employees, are covered by a defined benefit pension plan.  Most eligible employees were 
working full time (as defined as more than 38 hours per week), were white, and were 
neither lecturers nor researchers.  Eligible employees have an average of 24 years of 
seniority, which is well above the required 10 years for SRI eligibility, and their years of 
service varies widely across individuals and has a standard deviation of 8 years.  The 
average age of SRI eligible employees was 60 and 63% were women.    
The first column of panel B shows the fraction of SRI eligible individuals 
employed in different units at the Ithaca campus of the university.7 These units are the ten 
different colleges at Cornell and three composite other units that we have created; student 
services, academic programs, and administration and support.8  The units have 
                                                 
6 Using the Health and Retirement Survey, Bound, et. al. (1999); Brown (2000) and Dwyer and 
Hu (2000) showed that higher employee health is negatively correlated with the decision to retire 
while spousal health has a positive association with retirement probabilities.   Stock & Wise 
(1990) and Samwick (1998) show that the present discounted value of future wealth from retiring 
at a given date is an important factor in retirement decisions. 
7 Cornell also has campuses in New York City and Doha, Qatar.  Only Ithaca employees were 
eligible for the SRI. 
8 Employment unit codes are as follows: SS “Student Services”, AP “Academic Programs”, AS 
“Administration and Support”, CALS “College of Agriculture and Life Sciences”, AAP 
“Architecture, Art & Planning”, ART “Arts and Sciences”, ENG “Engineering”, HOTEL “Hotel 
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considerable autonomy in making staffing decisions and in deciding how to allocate 
resources.  Furthermore, because funding of the different units comes from a variety of 
sources, for example some of the colleges receive some appropriations from New York 
State and the endowment level per student varies across colleges, the units face different 
budgetary pressures.  To emphasize this point, Figure 1 displays both budgeted resources 
and salary expenditures per employee in $10,000’s, averaged from 2005 to 2008, by unit, 
with the vertical lines representing two standard error bands around the mean. This figure 
indicates that there was substantial variation in per employee resources and budgeted 
salary expenditures among units, with movements between salary and resource levels 
being very similar across units.  The extent of variability in within unit budget amounts 
for the years 2005 to 2008 differs among the units with the most variability displayed by 
the Academic Programs (AP) unit for both per employee resources and salary, and the 
least variability shown by School of Hotel Administration (HOTEL) for resources and by 
Student Services (SS) for salary.  
The variability in resources over time across units comes from the variety of 
revenue sources the units receive and the variability in each source over time. The units 
differ in the shares of their revenues coming from tuition, gifts, endowment income, 
sponsored programs, state and federal appropriations and allocations from the central 
administration.  In our empirical work we focus on unit level per employee budgeted 
resources and salary expenditures as the measures that eligible employees may focus on 
in thinking about the financial pressures that their units face. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Administration”, CHE “College of Human Ecology”, ILR “Industrial and Labor Relations”, JS 
“Johnson School”, LAW “Law School”, VET “College of Veterinary Medicine”.  
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The remaining columns of Table 1 display comparisons of means for those 
eligible employees that enrolled in the SRI and those that declined the retirement 
incentive offer.  Some eligible employees were probably inclined to retire within the 
interval of time that the SRI required accepted applicants to retire (March 1, 2000 – June 
30, 2009) independent of the SRI.  Their retirement decisions could be motivated by 
variables such as age, years of service, health, and family considerations, so it is 
important to control for these variables in our statistical analyses.  The comparison of 
means for those that accepted and declined the retirement incentive sheds light on some 
of the variables that may prove to be important in our multivariate analyses. 
Retirement age incentives appear in government policies and in employee benefit 
structures.  The Internal Revenue Service specifies ages for minimum distributions and 
penalty free withdrawal of retirement funds, while the Social Security Administration 
specifies ages for receipt of full or partial Social Security benefits. Defined benefit 
pension plan structures also play a role by setting how annual pension benefits levels 
depend upon years of service, age at retirement, and a measure of average “final” salary.  
For these reasons we might expect the relationship between SRI enrollment, age, and 
years of service to be increasing but non-linear.  Indeed, Table 1 shows that individuals 
that enrolled in the SRI are on average 2.19 years older and worked 2.26 more years at 
Cornell, than individuals who turned down the opportunity to accept the retirement 
incentive offer.  Further analyses reported below describe the non-linear relationship. 
Having a dependent child on an employee’s health plan is associated with not 
accepting the retirement incentive.  This may reflect the age of the employee or that the 
employee has greater financial responsibilities that reduces the attractiveness of the 
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incentive.  Finally, on average, employees who accepted the incentive offer had lower 
levels of salaries and recent salary growth than employees who did not enroll in the 
program. 
Differences in all of the factors mentioned above across employment units at the 
university may be responsible for the differences in enrollment rates across employment 
units observed in Panel B of Table 1. For example, while 3.8% of eligible employees 
were from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR), 6.3% of the employees 
who accepted the incentive offer came from this unit. In contrast, while 1.9% of the 
eligible employees came from Cornell’s Law School (LAW), only 1.10% of the 
employees who accepted the incentive came from this unit.  As such, we turn to a 
multivariate analysis to see if differences in acceptance rates across units still exist after 
we control for the characteristics of the eligible non-union eligible employees in each unit 
that are available to us in our data. 
Appendix Table 1 presents estimates of a linear probability model of SRI 
enrollment (Yes = 1, No =0) as a function of all of the eligible employee characteristics 
listed in panel A of Table 1 as well as dichotomous variables for the units (panel B) in 
which the employee was employed.9 In this model, the continuous age and years of 
service variables have been converted to two-year binary indicator variables to allow the 
effects of age and years of service on the acceptance decision to be nonlinear.  The 
omitted (reference) group in the model is individuals who are white male employees ages 
55-56 with 10 to 15 years of service, who are employed in the administration and support 
unit (AS).  These estimates suggest that in the multivariate context there are no 
                                                 
9 For comparison purposes a logit model is also presented in this table; the signs and significance 
of the coefficients are very similar in the two models. 
 
 
11
statistically significant differences in the acceptance probabilities associated with 
employees’ full-time/part-time status, academic/nonacademic staff status, race/ethnicity, 
retirement plan type, or presence of spouse or dependents on the employee’s health 
insurance.   
In Figure 2, we graphically display the coefficients (with two standard error bands) 
that show the impact of the age, years of service, and employment unit dichotomous 
variables from Appendix Table 1 on the decision to accept the retirement incentive offer. 
The acceptance probability increases monotonically with age at a decreasing rate until 
roughly ages 63 and over when it flattens out. The acceptance probability also increases 
with years of service, with the steepness of the relationship increasing after 30 years of 
service. The point estimates suggest that an individual with 36 years of service or more 
has about a 15 percentage point higher probability of accepting the offer than an 
individual with 10-15 years of service, all other factors held constant. Presumably many 
individuals with such long years of service would be contemplating retirement even in 
the absence of the program. 
It is apparent in the bottom panel of the figure that much variation still exists in 
enrollment probabilities across employment units even after we control for individual’s 
personal characteristics including age and years of service.  Relative to the omitted group 
(Administration and Support), employees employed in the Academic Programs unit (AP) 
and the College of Arts and Sciences (ART) are less likely to enroll in the SRI, while 
individuals from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) are more likely to 
enroll in the SRI.10   
                                                 
10 The differences in the precision of the estimated coefficients of the employment unit variables 
are driven largely by differences in sample sizes. Some of the precisely estimated coefficients (for 
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In what follows we try to better understand this heterogeneity of enrollment rates 
among the employment units that persists even when conditioning on factors such as age, 
years of service, defined benefit, union status, and family characteristics. Specifically our 
focus is on individual’s perceptions of their risk of being laid off and on whether they are 
paid less, or more, than average given their personal and job characteristics. 
B.3 Econometric framework 
 
We estimate models of the form y୧୨ ൌ Fൣα ൅ ܆୧ᇱ઼ ൅ γp୧ ൅  βz୨൧ ൅ Ԗ୧୨ where F is a 
linear model or a logistic transformation, i indexes the individual and j indexes the 
employment unit.  The outcome, ݕ௜௝, is 1 if individual ݅ in employment unit ݆ enrolled in 
the SRI and is 0 otherwise.  Individual level controls are included in the vector ܆୧, while 
p୧ is a proxy for a measure of the employee’s productivity, and z୨ is an employment unit 
level factor that we hypothesize is associated with SRI enrollment. The vector ܆୧ contains 
many of the variables found in panel A of Table 1. 
In the absence of an observable measure of actual productivity, it is common in 
the literature to obtain a proxy for productivity by making some comparison of salaries 
across individuals.11  If we can identify individuals who are performing roughly the same 
work and if we believe that the university’s merit pay policies lead individuals’ salaries to 
be roughly proportionate to their productivity, then we can use a measure of an 
individual’s “relative” salary as a measure of his or her relative productivity.  With our 
                                                                                                                                                 
example those for academic programs (AP) and the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences 
(CALS)) have over 150 individuals in the eligible population, while some of the imprecisely 
estimated coefficients (for example those for the College of Architecture, Art and Planning (AAP) 
and the Hotel School (HOTEL)) have fewer than 15 individuals in the eligible population. 
11 See, e.g., Pencavel, (2001); Ashenfelter & Card (2002); Allen, Clark, & Ghent (2004); Kim 
(2003). 
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rich administrative data that provides us with information on pay bands, time in most 
recent position, and functional job categories, we are able to narrowly define groups of 
potentially substitutable workers and develop relative salary measures. 
To construct our relative salary measure, ݌௜, we first estimate the following 
equation, 
s୧ ൌ  ෍ Band୧୩δ୩ ൅  ෍ Fam୧୫γ୫ ൅ ܆ᇱܑ
୬ౣ
୫ୀଵ
୬ౡ
୩ୀଵ
ૐ ൅ η୧ 
where ݏ௜ is the log of 2009 fiscal year salary for individual ݅.  Included on the right hand 
side are job band dichotomous variables (ܤܽ݊݀௜௞, equal to 1 if individual ݅ is in job band 
݇ and is 0 otherwise), as well as job family indicators, (ܨܽ݉௜௠ equal to 1 if individual ݅ 
is in job family ݉ and is 0 otherwise).  The vector ࢄ࢏ is comprised of indicator variables 
for whether the employee is fulltime and non-academic staff, a continuous variable for 
years since job entry date, employment unit indicators, and years of service indicators at 
the same level of aggregation as described in Section B.2.12  
Our relative salary measure is given by the portion of salary unexplained by this 
linear equation (the residual); this is normalized by its standard deviation for ease of 
interpretation.  Formally, our proxy for relative salary is estimated as ݌௜ ൌ ௣೔
כ
ఙ೛כ where  
݌௜כ ൌ s୧ െ ∑ Band୧୩ δ୩෢ െ  ∑ Fam୧୫γ୫ෞ െ ܆ᇱܑ୬ౣ୫ୀଵ୬ౡ୩ୀଵ ૐ෡  and ߪ௣כ is the standard deviation 
of ݌௜כ.13  We interpret ݌௜ as the difference in individual ݅’s salary from the average salary 
of her closely substitutable coworkers and we will refer to ݌௜ in what follows as ‘relative 
pay’. 
                                                 
12 Results are not dependent on this specification.  Changing the aggregation cut-points, including 
age, age and age squared result in virtually no change in the second stage coefficient estimates. 
13 The standard deviation of the residual is 0.17. 
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This relative pay variable is estimated from a first stage equation; thus, it is 
subject to sampling variation and its inclusion in the SRI enrollment equation may bias 
conventional standard errors.  Standard errors that do not account for this variation will 
be smaller than corrected standard errors if the disturbances are uncorrelated; however, if 
disturbances are correlated the direction is unknown.  To show the impact on our 
standard errors from a bias correction for this variation in the relative pay variable we 
also compute standard errors that use the method proposed by Murphy & Topel (2002). 
Another statistical issue that we face is the possibility of within employment unit 
correlation of disturbances.  Because we do not observe phenomena such as management 
style, work environment, peer effects, or promotion structure, it is possible that 
employees within units are affected in similar ways by these unobservables.  Uncorrected, 
standard errors could be smaller leading us to make incorrect claims about the 
significance of effects.  A common correction for this is to use the method of Liang & 
Zeger (1986) which nonparametrically adjusts the covariance matrix to account for 
clustering as well as heteroskedasticity.  The problem with applying this method to our 
research study is that it relies on group asymptotics and we have only 13 employment 
units.  With a random effects framework, parametric adjustments and Generalized 
Estimating Equations (GEE) similarly are infeasible with such a small number of groups; 
however, a corrected GEE  covariance matrix by the method of Bias Reduced 
Linearization (BRL) developed by Bell & McCaffrey (2002) is a possible solution for 
problems related to the small number of groups.  Bell & McCaffrey show, with Monte 
Carlo methods, that BRL seems to generate statistical tests of the correct size when 
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applied to random effects models with normally distributed errors (Angrist & Lavy, 2009) 
even when the group size is small. 
In practice, we find that the corrections we make for these statistical challenges 
with either the method of Murphy & Topel or Bell & McCaffrey lead to little adjustments 
on inference from robust standard errors.  However, we do not simultaneously correct for 
both concerns and it could be argued that the bias from each statistical issue would, if 
combined, equal more than the sum of the differences we observe individually.  
C Results 
C.1 Adverse selection 
 
Employers relying on a labor force reduction tool that shifts the discretion of exit 
to the employee need to be confident that the “right” employees choose to enroll.  The 
risk is that highly productive employees would be more likely to opt into the SRI since 
the probability of obtaining a position elsewhere could be a less risky and a more 
lucrative prospect for these individuals.  If the employer loses highly productive 
employees they may also have lost substantial investments in human capital that it has 
made. 
To evaluate if the “right” type of employees enrolled in the SRI, we proceed in 
two steps.  First, we investigate whether a low value of our relative pay variable, the 
proxy for productivity, is associated with being laid off.  Specifically, did the university, 
when it used the discretionary tool of a layoff choose to terminate employees with low 
relative pay? Second, we test for whether low relative pay is associated with the decision 
to enroll in the SRI.   
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To accomplish the first step we generate a new relative pay variable constructed 
from a combination of our SRI non-union eligible population with the population of 177 
non-union individuals that suffered layoffs from January, 2005 to March, 2009.  Layoffs 
for this population are for reasons defined as “lack of funds”, “lack of work”, or 
“reorganization”.  If low relative pay does indicate the “right” type of employee to enroll 
in the SRI we would expect that the employees laid off in these prior years were of lower 
relative pay.14 
To calculate the relative pay variables on the combination of these two 
populations a few adjustments are necessary.  First, we convert the last annual equivalent 
salary received by the laid off population into a 2009 equivalent using the between year 
salary growth rate from our SRI population.  Second, we increase the years of service of 
the laid off population to reflect the amount should they have been employed to 2009.15  
Further, two variables, the statutory/endowed indicator (which we use to distinguish 
certain pay band differences within the AS and AP units) and the years since job entry 
date, are not available for our layoff population.  Then, to construct this new relative pay 
variable, ݌௡௘௪, we exclude those variables from the regression.  We are confident that 
this does not materially impact a comparison between the new relative pay variable and 
the relative pay variable calculated exclusively on the SRI non-union eligible population.  
                                                 
14 Of course, the low relative pay could also serve as a proxy for something else. 
15 Concerned that our method of adjusting the laid off population’s salary and years of service 
could contribute to the distributional differences we observe, we also make the comparison using 
the following alternative method.  Using the historic salary information from our SRI population, 
we separately compute a value for the relative pay variable for each year an employee was laid 
off.  For example, employees laid off in 2006 will be included in a regression with the SRI 
population (at their 2006 salary and years of service) to compute a value for the relative pay 
variable.  This method leads to very similar distributional differences between the relative pay 
variable for the laid off and SRI populations, with the gap in means slightly more dramatic.   
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The correlation coefficient between p୬ୣ୵ and p conditional on our SRI non-union 
eligible population is 0.978.   
In Figure 3 we show kernel density plots of p୬ୣ୵ for the SRI enrollment 
population and the layoff population using the epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 
0.17.16  The density for the layoff population is shifted to the left with a mean of -0.29 
while the SRI population is centered at 0.05.  These means are significantly different with 
a t-statistic of over 3.  There is observably much variation in the relative pay variable 
among the layoff population. 
A possible explanation for this variation is that wide differences existed in how 
binding the sets of feasible employees under consideration for a layoff were for layoffs 
that occurred from 2005 to 2009.  Although the university has discretion in choosing 
whom to layoff among workers not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, in 
effect it may be limited to selecting individuals from a pool attached to a particular 
project or program.  We would anticipate that a reorganization would impose the lowest 
constraint on its behavior, while it is unclear whether a lack of funds for a position or a 
lack of work for an employee or group would be more binding on its actions.  If funds are 
truly fungible a “lack of funds” might actually indicate an unwillingness of the university 
to make an allocation, perhaps because the set is not actually binding.  Alternatively, a 
“lack of work” could imply an unwillingness of the university to reposition a valued 
employee, again indicating a non-binding constraint.      
A further test then for the validity of the relative pay variable in serving as a 
proxy for productivity is to see how consistent it is with our expectations about how 
                                                 
16 The bandwidth chosen is the minimum of the optimal bandwidths of each density computed as 
the bandwidth that would minimize the mean integrated squared error if the data were distributed 
Gaussian and a Gaussian kernel were used. 
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constrained each of the sets is above.  It seems reasonable to assume that when using a 
layoff the university would want to minimize the average of the productivity lost.  If we 
order the three groups of layoffs by the mean of the relative pay of the individuals laid off 
in each group, we have [Reorganization (-0.42), Lack of Funds (-0.19), Lack of Work (-
0.17)] from low to high. This roughly indicates that the reorganization feasible set is the 
least binding, consistent with our expectation.   
We will now evaluate how SRI enrollment is associated with the characteristic of 
low relative pay.  Using our relative pay variable calculated only on the set of SRI non-
union eligible individuals, we estimate linear probability and logit models of SRI 
enrollment on relative pay and subsets of the variables previously included in Appendix 
Table 1. The coefficients of the relative pay variable from each of the models are found 
in Table 2. 
  The coefficient on relative pay is stable across specifications, ranging from -0.032 
to -0.034 with little difference between the OLS and logit marginal effects.  Standard 
error adjustments do not change the conclusions drawn.  Our model suggests that a one 
standard deviation decrease in relative pay is associated with a 3.22% increase in the 
probability of enrolling in the SRI.17 
                                                 
17 A final test for interpreting our relative pay variable as a proxy for productivity was to estimate 
its effect on eligible employees’ decisions to accept the retirement incentive offer in a sample of 
eligible employees who were covered by collective bargaining agreements (most of this paper is 
focused on the non-union population, the large majority of staff at Cornell). Inasmuch as these 
agreements do not provide for merit pay increases, we might expect that the coefficient of the 
relative pay variable would be statistically insignificantly different from zero when we estimate 
the relationship between SRI enrollment and relative pay for this sample (if the relationship in the 
nonunion sample is due to relatively low productive non union employees enrolling in the SRI). 
While the coefficient for the collective bargaining sample was statistically insignificantly 
different from zero at the .05 level of significance, it was negative and its absolute magnitude was 
larger than the similar coefficient from the sample of nonunion employees reported in the text. 
The magnitude of this coefficient in the collective bargaining sample reduces our confidence 
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C.2 Job related risk factors 
 
We suspect that employees consider a distribution of possible future employment 
durations at the university when deciding whether to enroll in the SRI. Their perceptions 
of being involuntarily terminated from the university in the future surely influences their 
decision whether to accept the incentive offer. In the remainder of our paper we include 
variables that may be indicators of future job-loss risk into the equations that predict 
whether an individual will enroll in the SRI. Our research design makes use of the 
variation in layoffs, budgeted resources, and budgeted salary expenditures across 
employment units at the university from FY 2006 up until the SRI enrollment date of 
March 31, 2009.  Each measure is deflated by the beginning of fiscal year employee 
count to convert raw layoff and budget change numbers to a per employee number; we 
believe that these measures will be the ones that employees will focus on when 
contemplating their likelihood of future layoff.  
Of the indicators, layoffs are likely to be the most salient – a coworker’s 
disappearance would be more troubling and apparent than a change in resources or 
budgeted salary expenditure.  However, layoffs occur very infrequently in the data, 
approximately 200 between the start of FY 2005 and March 2009.  The between unit 
standard deviation is only 5 per 1,000 employees. In contrast, the variation in per 
employee budgeted resources and salary expenditure is more substantial with a between 
unit standard deviation of $100,000 for per employee resources and half that for per 
employee salary expenditures.  Of more importance to us, the difference in 2009 and 
2008 per employee resources has a standard deviation of $15,000 among employment 
                                                                                                                                                 
somewhat that our relative pay variable is a good proxy for relative productivity in the non 
collective bargaining sample. 
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units while the standard deviation of the difference for salary per employee over the same 
period is $4,000.   
However, there are some drawbacks to using per employee budgeted resource or 
salary expenditure changes.  A reduction in resources could indicate a reduction in 
facility expense or available supplies, or a failure to replace computers or peripherals and 
not actually suggest any immediate job loss risk to the employee.  In this scenario, it 
might be that any effect we observe is motivated by a reduction in the quality of the 
employee’s work environment and not from job loss related risk as we hypothesize.  Our 
salary expenditure measure reflects the apportioned amount of resources available per 
employee and if it proves statistically significant, its effect may be directly due to job loss 
concerns  
The layoff indicators we use are averages of layoffs per 1,000 employees by 
employment unit across a number of years.  Similarly our budgeted resources and salary 
expenditure measures are changes in per employee amounts in units of $10,000 per 
employee by employment unit.  The unconditional relationship between SRI enrollment 
probabilities and various indicators of job-loss risk are shown in Figure 4.  In the top left 
panel we graph unit SRI enrollment probabilities against the 2006 to 2009 unit layoffs per 
1,000 employees.  The correlation is clearly positive. Because the observation for the 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) appears to be an outlier, when we conduct 
multivariate analyses that include the layoff risk variables below, we will experiment 
with omitting ILR employees from our analyses to see if this omission materially alters 
any of our conclusions.  Our results suggest their omission does not make a difference. 
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In the right panels we again graph unit SRI enrollment probabilities, but now with 
either 2009 minus 2008 budgeted resources per employee in $10,000 increments (top) or 
2009 minus 2008 budgeted salary expenditures per employee in $10,000 increments 
(bottom).  The correlation of each of these variables across units with the probability that 
the unit’s non-union eligible employees enrolled in the SRI is negative; this suggests that 
reductions or smaller increases in available per employee resources are associated with 
SRI enrollment.  These raw correlations do not account for the distribution of any of the 
individual level covariates that also are associated with SRI enrollment. So in the 
following sections we will estimate the effect of these unit resource variables holding 
constant the individual level variables, including relative pay. 
C.2.i Layoffs as indicators 
 
In Table 3 we report linear probability model coefficient estimates and logit 
model marginal effects for our relative pay and layoff variables in trying to predict SRI 
enrollment.  The models reported in Panel A use unit layoffs per 1,000 employees 
averaged across the years 2006 to 2009. The models reported in Panels B and C are 
similar except that they use 3 and 2 year averages, respectively, for the layoff variables.  
Column (1) shows the coefficient estimates for relative pay and our various layoff 
measures, when we control for employees’ age, years of service, full-time/part-time 
status and academic/nonacademic position status.  Columns (2) through (5) add 
additional explanatory variables to the models to see how sensitive our relative pay and 
layoff variables are to their inclusion. 
Looking first at the relative pay coefficients, their magnitudes are not significantly 
different across specifications and not significantly different from the estimates reported 
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in Table 2 from models that exclude the layoff probability variables.  Similarly, the 
coefficients on the layoff variables show little change across specification within each 
panel.  Finally, the effect size on each layoff variable construction differs little depending 
on which average we choose.  Using the layoff variable constructed from a four year 
average subject to the largest number of covariates, (Column (5)), the coefficient of 
0.0181 implies that an increase of 5 layoffs per 1,000 employees is associated with a 9 
percentage point increase in the probability of enrolling in the SRI.  This suggests that 
employees were responding to perceptions of job-loss risk when deciding to accept the 
SRI. 
C.2.ii Resource deviations as indicators 
 
We estimated similar models to those shown in Table 3 with deviations in 
resources in place of layoffs as potential measures of job-loss risk and the results are 
presented in Table 4. Panel A includes a variable constructed as the 2009 total budgeted 
resources per employee less the 2008 total budgeted resources per employee in units of 
$10,000.  Panels B and C contain similar resource measure, with the deviations of the 
2009 amounts from two and three year previous averages, respectively.  The effect size 
diminishes from -0.022 for a one year deviation to approximately -0.008 for a deviation 
from a three year average, only significant at the 5% level for the one year deviation.  
This drop in effect size may reflect the limited time horizon employees consider when 
focusing on previous resource levels.  Interpreting the coefficient on the one year 
deviation in resources reported in Column (5), a one standard deviation unit increase in 
resources of $15,000/employee is associated with a 3.3 percentage point decrease in the 
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probability of enrolling in the SRI.  The one year budgeted resource deviation provides 
more support that employees were responding to perceptions of job loss risk. 
 
C.2.iii Budgeted salary expenditure deviations as a risk measure 
 
Our final measure of job-loss risk is reported in Table 5.  Here we include three 
panels as in Table 4 with Panel A reporting results based on regressions that include 2009 
per employee budgeted salary expenditures less 2008 per employee budgeted salary 
expenditures and the remaining panels report regressions that have a deviation from  two 
or three previous year averages.  Similar to the resource measures, the coefficient on the 
salary measure is consistently significant across specification only in the first panel.  
Because the movements and levels of the budgeted resources and budgeted salary 
measures per employee are highly correlated (Figure 1) we might expect each measure to 
essentially produce the same impact on employee acceptance of the incentive.  Results 
from Panel A suggest that an increase in budgeted per employee salary expenditures of 
one standard deviation ($4,000/employee) is associated with a decrease in the probability 
of enrolling in the SRI ranging from 3.3 to 3.8 percentage points - almost identical to the 
impact we reported above of a one standard deviation increase in the resource variable.  
The one year budgeted salary expenditure deviation provides further support that 
employees responded to perceptions of job loss risk. 
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C.2.iv Do individuals of lower relative pay respond differently to job­loss risk and 
Does excluding individuals from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
Matter? 
 
We have found that, on average, individuals with lower relative pay were more 
likely to accept the offer of the retirement incentive. A subsidiary issue is whether these 
lower relative pay individuals are more sensitive to the possibility of future layoff and 
thus more likely to weight such a possibility more heavily in their acceptance decision. 
Panel A of Table 6  presents estimated coefficients from models that test if this occurs; 
we estimate models in which we restrict the sample first to people with relative pay 
above the mean and then with relative pay below the mean.  Recalling that the layoff and 
SRI acceptance rates for ILR were both much higher than for the rest of the university, 
we further restrict the sample in Panel B, excluding employees from ILR, to see if 
excluding the relatively small number of employees from this unit influences our 
estimated coefficients.  
Effect sizes between Panels A and B are very similar suggesting that our 
estimated relationships were not driven by the one “outlier” unit.  Moreover, we are not 
able to reject the hypothesis that employees whose relative pay variable is below or above 
average react differently to layoff probabilities or other measures of unit financial stress 
in making their decisions whether to accept the retirement incentive offer.    
C.2.v Does one indicator dominate? 
 
Finally, in Table 7 we simultaneously include our layoff risk indicator with the 
resource variable in Column 4, and with the salary variable in Column 5, to better assess 
which effect is more important in employees’ decisions whether to accept the retirement 
incentive.  The effects of these variables when they were included in the model one at a 
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time are shown in Columns 1 through 3 for comparative purposes.  The coefficient on the 
layoff variable changes very little when either the salary or resource variable is also 
included in the model.  In contrast, the salary and resource coefficients are approximately 
cut in half when the layoff variable is included in the model and their statistical 
significance is greatly reduced.  These findings suggest that the disappearance of co-
workers through layoffs is more relevant in a decision to accept early retirement than 
strictly financial indicators like resource or salary changes.  
D Conclusion 
 
The Cornell Staff Retirement Incentive (SRI) program helped the university to 
moderate the number of its employees that it subsequently laid off as it tried to restore its 
economic balance after the economic dislocation of 2008.  We have provided evidence 
that employees’ decisions to accept the incentive were conditioned on their perceptions of 
the economic stress that their units faced.  In addition, to the extent that our relative pay 
variable is a proxy for employees’ relative productivity, our results also suggest that 
adverse selection was not a problem for the university; on average it was the lower 
relative pay employees who accepted the retirement incentive offer.   
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Figure 1: Depiction of the variation in budgeted per employee resource and salary levels among units: Per employee 
budgeted resource and salary levels are averaged from 2005 to 2008 in $10,000 units graphed against employment units 
with two standard error bands shown in grey 
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Figure 2: Coefficients on age, years of service, and employment unit dummies from a regression of enrollment in SRI 
(Yes = 1) on age, years of service, employment unit and other covariates with two standard error bands (See Appendix I).  
Age is in comparison to those aged 55-56, years of service to 10-15, and employment unit to AS. 
Employment unit codes are as follows: SS “Student Services”, AP “Academic Programs”, AS “Administration and 
Support”, CALS “College of Agriculture and Life Sciences”, AAP “Architecture, Art & Planning”, ART “Arts and 
Sciences”, ENG “Engineering”, HOTEL “Hotel Administration”, CHE “College of Human Ecology”, ILR “Industrial and 
Labor Relations”, JS “Johnson School”, LAW “Law School”, VET “College of Veterinary Medicine”. 
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Figure 3: Kernel density plots of the relative pay variable calculated on the layoff and SRI non-union eligible combined 
sample shown for each sample separately
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Figure 4: Unconditional relationship between SRI enrollment (Yes = 1) and unit layoffs, per employee salary and resource levels.  
Dot sizes are in proportion to the size of the non-union eligible population employed in that unit.  
Employment unit codes are as follows: SS “Student Services”, AP “Academic Programs”, AS “Administration and Support”, 
CALS “College of Agriculture and Life Sciences”, AAP “Architecture, Art & Planning”, ART “Arts and Sciences”, ENG 
“Engineering”, HOTEL “Hotel Administration”, CHE “College of Human Ecology”, ILR “Industrial and Labor Relations”, JS 
“Johnson School”, LAW “Law School”, VET “College of Veterinary Medicine”. 
SS
AP
AS
CALS
AAP
ART
ENG
HOTEL
CHE
ILRJS
LAW
VET
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Fr
ac
tio
n 
th
at
 e
nr
ol
le
d 
in
 th
e 
S
R
I
0 5 10 15 20
Unit layoffs as a share of unit employment
multiplied by 1,000 for scale
and averaged over 2006-2009
SS
AP
AS
CALS
AAP
ART ENG
HOTEL
CHE
ILR JS
LAW
VET
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Fr
ac
tio
n 
th
at
 e
nr
ol
le
d 
in
 th
e 
S
R
I
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
2009 per emp budgeted resources
less 2008 per employee budgeted resources
in $10,000 units
SS
AP
AS
CALS
AAP
ART
ENG
HOTEL
CHE
ILR JS
LAW
VET
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Fr
ac
tio
n 
th
at
 e
nr
ol
le
d 
in
 th
e 
S
R
I
0 .5 1 1.5
2009 per emp budgeted salary expenditures
less 2008 per employee budgeted salary expenditures
in $10,000 units
 Table 1:  Mean comparisons for key explanatory variables 
 
        
Variable ALL Enrolled Declined Difference T-stat  
       
Panel A: Socioeconomic       
Age 60.071 61.544 59.352 2.192 8.92 ***
Yrs of Service 24.437 25.958 23.694 2.264 4.32 ***
Fulltime 0.893 0.881 0.899 -0.018 -0.9  
Non-academic staff 0.828 0.855 0.814 0.041 1.67  
Female 0.625 0.645 0.616 0.029 0.92  
Asian 0.02 0.009 0.025 -0.016 -1.83  
Black 0.021 0.02 0.021 -0.001 -0.1  
Hispanic 0.011 0.009 0.012 -0.003 -0.58  
Unknown 0.007 0.014 0.003 0.011 2.19 *
White 0.942 0.949 0.939 0.01 0.65  
Defined benefit plan 0.16 0.188 0.147 0.041 1.7  
Spouse or partner on health plan 0.445 0.435 0.451 -0.016 -0.5  
Dependent child on health plan 0.235 0.176 0.264 -0.088 -3.18 **
Salary 2006 to 2009 rel change 0.148 0.13 0.156 -0.026 -3.12 **
Log 2009 salary 11.022 10.978 11.044 -0.066 -2.29 *
       
Panel B: Employment units       
Student Services (SS) 0.086 0.068 0.094 -0.026 -1.44  
Academic Programs (AP) 0.154 0.131 0.165 -0.034 -1.47  
Administration and Support (AS) 0.291 0.321 0.276 0.045 1.52  
College of Agriculture and Life 
Sciences (CALS) 
      
0.163 0.168 0.161 0.007 0.28  
Architecture, Art, & Planning 
(AAP) 0.011 0.014 0.01 0.004 0.66  
Arts and Sciences (ART) 0.096 0.077 0.105 -0.028 -1.5  
Engineering (ENG) 0.029 0.026 0.031 -0.005 -0.45  
Hotel Administration (HOTEL) 0.012 0.009 0.014 -0.005 -0.75  
College of Human Ecology (CHE) 0.029 0.037 0.025 0.012 1.1  
Industrial and Labor Relations 
(ILR) 0.038 0.063 0.026 0.037 2.91 **
Johnson School (JS) 0.016 0.026 0.011 0.015 1.78  
Law School (LAW) 0.019 0.011 0.022 -0.011 -1.23  
College of Veterinary Medicine 
(VET) 0.057 0.051 0.06 -0.009 -0.56  
 Table 2:  Coefficients on the relative pay variable from regressions of SRI enrollment (Yes = 1) on relative pay and hierarchical compositions of covariates 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
  OLS Logit  OLS Logit  OLS Logit  OLS Logit  OLS Logit 
Relative -0.0332 -0.0331  -0.0336 -0.0336  -0.0339 -0.0343  -0.0337 -0.0341  -0.0322 -0.0296 
Pay (0.0136)* (0.0138)*  (0.0136)* (0.0138)*  (0.0136)* (0.0138)*  (0.0137)* (0.0139)*  (0.0138)* (0.0137)* 
 [0.0136]*   [0.0136]*   [0.0136]*   [0.0136]*   [0.0134]*  
 {0.0134}*   {0.0137}*   {0.0135}*   {0.0140}*     
               
Covariates included in the models above:             
               
Age, yrs of service,  fulltime 
and academic staff dummies YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
               
Gender and ethnicity    YES  YES  YES  YES
               
Defined benefit       YES  YES  YES
               
Family characteristics          YES  YES
               
Unit dummies and salary change              YES
               
Sample size is 1073.  P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with OIM for logit.  
Standard errors calculated via Murphy & Topel (1985) shown in brackets.   
Standard errors calculated using the method of biased reduced linearization proposed by Bell & McCaffrey (2002) shown in curly braces clustering on unit dummies. 
 
 
  
 Table 3: Layoff and relative pay coefficients from regressions of SRI enrollment (Yes = 1) on hierarchical compositions of covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
           
Panel A: 4 year average          
           
Relative pay -0.0334 -0.0329 -0.0336 -0.0333 -0.0338 -0.0335 -0.0334 -0.0331 -0.0329 -0.0298 
 (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0139)* 
           
Per unit layoffs  
2009-2006 average 
0.0199 0.0191 0.0194 0.0186 0.0187 0.0178 0.0188 0.0179 0.0189 0.0181 
(0.0045)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0043)*** 
              
Panel B: 3 year average          
           
Relative pay -0.0334 -0.0327 -0.0337 -0.0331 -0.0338 -0.0334 -0.0335 -0.0330 -0.0330 -0.0296 
 (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0139)* 
           
Per unit layoffs  
2009-2007 average 
0.0148 0.0140 0.0145 0.0137 0.0139 0.0131 0.0139 0.0131 0.0140 0.0132 
(0.0035)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0032)*** 
              
Panel C: 2 year average          
           
Relative pay -0.0335 -0.0331 -0.0336 -0.0334 -0.0338 -0.0337 -0.0334 -0.0334 -0.0330 -0.0302 
 (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0139)* 
           
Per unit layoffs  
2009-2008 average 
0.0145 0.0140 0.0140 0.0135 0.0133 0.0128 0.0134 0.0129 0.0134 0.0129 
(0.0036)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0033)*** 
           
           
Covariates included in the models above:         
           
Basica YES YES YES YES YES
           
Gender and ethnicity  YES YES YES YES
           
Defined benefit    YES YES YES
           
Family characteristics      YES YES
           
Salary change         YES
aBasic covariates include age, yrs of service,  fulltime and academic staff dummies.  P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
Sample size is 1073.  Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit. 
 Table 4: Resource and relative pay coefficients from regressions of SRI enrollment (Yes = 1) on hierarchical compositions of covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
           
Panel A: Deviation from prior year          
           
Relative pay -0.0333 -0.0335 -0.0334 -0.0339 -0.0337 -0.0345 -0.0335 -0.0343 -0.0330 -0.0317 
 (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0140)* 
           
 Res 2009 per emp dev 
from prior year 
-0.0233 -0.0242 -0.0219 -0.0224 -0.0216 -0.0223 -0.0216 -0.0222 -0.0212 -0.0217 
(0.0106)* (0.0109)* (0.0106)* (0.0110)* (0.0106)* (0.0110)* (0.0106)* (0.0110)* (0.0106)* (0.0110)* 
               
Panel B: Deviation from 2 year avg          
           
Relative pay -0.0332 -0.0333 -0.0334 -0.0338 -0.0337 -0.0345 -0.0335 -0.0343 -0.0331 -0.0315 
 (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0137)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0141)* 
           
 Res 2009 per emp dev 
from 2 year  avg 
-0.0190 -0.0195 -0.0180 -0.0181 -0.0198 -0.0202 -0.0197 -0.0201 -0.0194 -0.0199 
(0.0130) (0.0126) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0127) 
               
Panel C: Deviation from 3 year avg          
           
Relative pay -0.0332 -0.0332 -0.0335 -0.0337 -0.0338 -0.0344 -0.0336 -0.0342 -0.0332 -0.0314 
 (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0137)* (0.0139)* (0.0136)* (0.0141)* 
           
 Res 2009 per emp dev 
from 3 year  avg 
-0.0068 -0.0071 -0.0055 -0.0057 -0.0088 -0.0092 -0.0087 -0.0091 -0.0081 -0.0083 
(0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0108) 
           
           
Covariates included in the models above:         
           
Basica YES YES YES YES YES
           
Gender and ethnicity  YES YES YES YES
           
Defined benefit    YES YES YES
           
Family characteristics      YES YES
           
Salary change          YES
aBasic covariates include age, yrs of service,  fulltime and academic staff dummies.  P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
Sample size is 1073.  Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit. 
 Table 5: Salary expenditures and relative pay coefficients from regressions of SRI enrollment (Yes = 1) on hierarchical compositions of covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
           
Panel A: Deviation from prior year          
           
Relative pay -0.0333 -0.0336 -0.0334 -0.0339 -0.0337 -0.0344 -0.0334 -0.0341 -0.0329 -0.0317 
 (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0139)* 
           
 Sal 2009 per emp dev from 
prior year 
-0.0918 -0.0950 -0.0881 -0.0901 -0.0834 -0.0859 -0.0837 -0.0860 -0.0830 -0.0846 
(0.0311)** (0.0326)** (0.0308)** (0.0327)** (0.0311)** (0.0329)** (0.0312)** (0.0329)** (0.0311)** (0.0330)* 
               
Panel B: Deviation from 2 year avg          
           
Relative pay -0.0333 -0.0335 -0.0334 -0.0339 -0.0337 -0.0345 -0.0334 -0.0343 -0.0330 -0.0317 
 (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0140)* 
           
 Sal 2009 per emp dev from 
2 year  avg 
-0.0778 -0.0792 -0.0737 -0.0745 -0.0702 -0.0716 -0.0703 -0.0715 -0.0706 -0.0709 
(0.0364)* (0.0366)* (0.0362)* (0.0367)* (0.0364) (0.0369) (0.0365) (0.0369) (0.0363) (0.0369) 
               
Panel C: Deviation from 3 year avg          
           
Relative pay -0.0332 -0.0332 -0.0335 -0.0337 -0.0338 -0.0344 -0.0336 -0.0342 -0.0332 -0.0314 
 (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0137)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0141)* 
           
 Sal 2009 per emp dev from 
3 year  avg 
-0.0388 -0.0395 -0.0331 -0.0341 -0.0368 -0.0383 -0.0365 -0.0378 -0.0357 -0.0359 
(0.0384) (0.0371) (0.0385) (0.0372) (0.0386) (0.0375) (0.0388) (0.0375) (0.0386) (0.0374) 
           
           
Covariates included in the models above:         
           
Basica YES YES YES YES YES
           
Gender and ethnicity  YES YES YES YES
           
Defined benefit    YES YES YES
           
Family characteristics      YES YES
           
Salary change          YES
aBasic covariates include age, yrs of service,  fulltime and academic staff dummies.  P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
Sample size is 1073.  Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit. 
  
Table 6: Regression of SRI (Yes = 1) on models with layoff, resource and salary change by relative pay 
  Relative pay >= 0         
  + Relative pay < 0  Relative pay >= 0   Relative pay < 0
 OLS Logit  OLS Logit  OLS Logit
Panel A: Everyone         
         
Dependent variable mean 0.3281  0.2832  0.3700
         
A.1: Models with layoff         
         
Layoff per emp 2006-2009 
avg 
0.0190 0.0183  0.0108 0.0111  0.0232 0.0222
(0.0049)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0068) (0.0069)  (0.0067)*** (0.0059)***
         
A.2: Models with resources         
         
Resource 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
-0.0214 -0.0211  -0.0060 -0.0064  -0.0360 -0.0353
(0.0106)* (0.011)  (0.0147) (0.0153)  (0.0151)* (0.0156)*
         
A.3: Models with salary         
         
Salary 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
-0.0838 -0.0828  -0.0560 -0.0590  -0.1032 -0.0996
(0.031)** (0.033)*  (0.0435) (0.0462)  (0.0452)* (0.0468)*
         
Sample size 1073  519   554
         
Panel B: Without ILR employees        
         
Dependent variable mean 0.3198  0.2809  0.3566
         
B.1: Models with layoff         
         
Layoff per emp 2006-2009 
avg 
0.0196 0.0193  0.0211 0.0209  0.0156 0.0158
(0.0089)* (0.0088)*  (0.0121) (0.0125)  (0.0132) (0.0125)
         
B.2: Models with resources         
         
Resource 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
-0.0223 -0.0218  -0.0068 -0.0073  -0.0375 -0.0364
(0.0106)* (0.0109)*  (0.0148) (0.0153)  (0.0151)* (0.0153)*
         
B.3: Models with salary         
         
Salary 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
-0.0785 -0.0763  -0.0584 -0.0611  -0.0942 -0.0887
(0.0313)* (0.0328)*  (0.0443) (0.0464)  (0.0452)* (0.0461)
         
Sample size 1032  502  530
              
Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit.   All models contain 
age, yrs of service, fulltime and academic staff dummies, gender and ethnicity, defined benefit, family characteristics, 
and salary change.   Not included are relative pay or unit dummies. 
 P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
  
Table 7: Regression of SRI (Yes = 1) on models with job loss indicators given individually and in combinationa 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
          
Panel A: OLS models         
          
Relative pay -0.0329  -0.0330  -0.0329  -0.0328  -0.0328
 (0.0136)*  (0.0136)*  (0.0136)*  (0.0136)*  (0.0136)*
          
Layoff per emp 2006-2009 
avg 
0.0189      0.0178  0.0168
(0.0048)***      (0.0049)*** (0.0051)***
          
Resource 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
  -0.0212    -0.0125   
  (0.0106)*    (0.0109)   
          
Salary 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
    -0.0830    -0.0465
    (0.0311)**   (0.0329)
             
          
Panel B: Logit models         
          
Relative pay -0.0298  -0.0317  -0.0317  -0.0303  -0.0304
 (0.0139)*  (0.0140)*  (0.0139)*  (0.0139)*  (0.0139)*
          
Layoff per emp 2006-2009 
avg 
0.0181      0.0170  0.0160
(0.0043)***      (0.0044)*** (0.0046)***
          
Resource 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
  -0.0217    -0.0130   
  (0.0110)*    (0.0112)   
          
Salary 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
    -0.0846    -0.0485
    (0.0330)*    (0.0343)
             
a The correlation between the salary and resource indicators is high (0.90).  Consequently, they are not 
included in the same regression. 
Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit.   All models 
contain age, yrs of service, fulltime and academic staff dummies, gender and ethnicity, defined benefit, family 
characteristics, and salary change.   Not included are unit dummies. 
 P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
 Appendix Table 1: Regression of enrolled in SRI (Yes = 1) on socioeconomic characteristics and 
employment unit dummies 
  OLS  LOGIT 
Aged 57-58 -0.0199  -0.0277 
 (0.0375)  (0.0484) 
    
Aged 59-60 0.1271**  0.1324** 
 (0.0438)  (0.0457) 
    
Aged 61-62 0.2242*** 0.2156*** 
 (0.0466)  (0.0450) 
    
Aged 63-64 0.2939*** 0.2791*** 
 (0.0551)  (0.0512) 
    
Aged 65-66 0.3010*** 0.2832*** 
 (0.0664)  (0.0586) 
    
Aged 67-68 0.3321*** 0.3165*** 
 (0.0873)  (0.0780) 
    
Aged 69+ 0.3749*** 0.3453*** 
 (0.0955)  (0.0781) 
    
Yrs Srv 16-20 0.0167  0.0184 
 (0.0459)  (0.0470) 
    
Yrs Srv 21-25 0.0400  0.0409 
 (0.0421)  (0.0435) 
    
Yrs Srv 26-30 0.0580  0.0608 
 (0.0430)  (0.0434) 
    
Yrs Srv 31-35 0.1180*  0.1157* 
 (0.0515)  (0.0487) 
    
Yrs Srv 36+ 0.1829**  0.1615** 
 (0.0614)  (0.0537) 
    
Fulltime -0.0148  -0.0051 
 (0.0513)  (0.0472) 
    
Non-academic staff 0.0550  0.0604 
 (0.0404)  (0.0429) 
    
Female 0.0157  0.0196 
  (0.0304)  (0.0300) 
    
Asian -0.1804*  -0.2202 
 (0.0776)  (0.1248) 
    
Black 0.0233  0.0228 
 (0.0966)  (0.0943) 
    
Hispanic -0.0195  -0.0097 
 (0.1417)  (0.1356) 
    
Unknown 0.3602  0.3140 
 (0.2015)  (0.1620) 
    
Defined benefit plan -0.0096  -0.0068 
 (0.0507)  (0.0481) 
    
Spouse or partner on health plan 0.0031  0.0048 
 (0.0296)  (0.0288) 
    
Dependent child on health plan -0.0226  -0.0238 
 (0.0330)  (0.0370) 
    
SS -0.0995  -0.0970 
 (0.0534)  (0.0542) 
    
AP -0.1234**  -0.1191** 
 (0.0438)  (0.0453) 
    
CALS 0.0047  0.0063 
 (0.0496)  (0.0487) 
    
AAP 0.0923  0.0984 
 (0.1507)  (0.1249) 
    
ART -0.1478**  -0.1445** 
 (0.0532)  (0.0553) 
    
ENG -0.1346  -0.1319 
 (0.0826)  (0.0858) 
    
HOTEL -0.1162  -0.1133 
 (0.1029)  (0.1326) 
    
CHE 0.0124  0.0137 
 (0.0963)  (0.0822) 
     
ILR 0.2280**  0.2120** 
 (0.0850)  (0.0729) 
    
JS 0.1648  0.1445 
 (0.1165)  (0.1039) 
    
LAW -0.1055  -0.1043 
 (0.0982)  (0.1117) 
    
VET -0.0518  -0.0434 
 (0.0671)  (0.0681) 
    
Salary 2006 to 2009 rel change -0.2086*  -0.3144* 
 (0.1029)  (0.1517) 
    
Log 2009 salary -0.0934*  -0.0866* 
 (0.0376)  (0.0368) 
    
Constant 1.2053**   
 (0.4133)   
      
Sample size is 1073.  Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed 
information matrix for logit. 
Employment unit codes are as follows: SS “Student Services”, AP “Academic Programs”, AS 
“Administration and Support”, CALS “College of Agriculture and Life Sciences”, AAP 
“Architecture, Art & Planning”, ART “Arts and Sciences”, ENG “Engineering”, HOTEL “Hotel 
Administration”, CHE “College of Human Ecology”, ILR “Industrial and Labor Relations”, JS 
“Johnson School”, LAW “Law School”, VET “College of Veterinary Medicine”. 
 
 
